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Mormonism, Originalism, and Utah’s Open 
Courts Clause 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Thirty-nine states’ constitutions, including Utah’s, have what is 
called an open courts or remedies clause.1 Each state constitution 
words the clause somewhat differently,2 but almost all of them say 
something similar to Utah’s constitution: “All courts shall be open, 
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay.”3 State high 
courts interpret this clause differently, however,4 generally falling 
into one of two camps. Some courts interpret the clause to provide 
only procedural protections similar to those found in the due process 
clause of the United States Constitution. But others interpret the 
clause to also provide substantive protections, limiting the 
legislature’s power to abrogate causes of action and remedies existing 
 
 1.  Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts 
Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1279 (1995). For a comprehensive list of 
each state’s clause see Judicial Administration: State Links, NCSC, http://www.ncsc.org/
Topics/Judicial-Officers/Judicial-Administration/ State-Links.aspx?cat=Constitutional %20
Access% 20to% 20Justice% 20Provisions (last visited Oct. 2014). 
 2.  Compare WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (“Justice in all cases shall be administered 
openly, and without unnecessary delay.”), with ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (“Every person shall 
find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, 
privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, 
and promptly.”). 
 3.  UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 11; see also ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 13; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 
11; ARK. CONST. art. 1, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 6; CONN. CONST. art. 2, § 6; DEL. 
CONST. art. 1, § 9; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 18; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12; IND. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 12; KY. CONST. § 14; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 22; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 19; MD. CONST. DEC. 
RIGHTS, art. 19; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 11; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8; MISS. CONST. art. 3, 
§ 24; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 14; MONT. CONST. art 2, § 16; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 13; N.C. 
CONST. art. 1, § 18; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 15; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 15; OKLA. CONST. art. 
2, § 6; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 20; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 19; TEX. 
CONST. art. 1, § 13; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 17; WYO. CONST. Art. 1, § 8. 
 4.  David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1203–17 (1992) 
(discussing various rules and interpretations high courts have given in interpreting their open 
courts clause). 
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at the time of the state constitution’s adoption.5 How a state 
interprets its open courts clause has a large effect on tort reform.6 It 
determines, for example, whether a doctor has to pay $1.25 million 
or only $250 thousand for negligently brain damaging a child.7 
Some variations in interpretation can be traced back to the different 
wording of each state’s open courts clause, but other variations 
cannot.8 Professor David Schuman suggests that each state look to 
its own history to determine the proper interpretation of its open 
courts clause.9 This Comment attempts to find the proper 
interpretation of Utah’s open courts clause through a 
historical survey. 
Currently, the Utah Supreme Court interprets its open courts 
clause to grant both procedural and substantive protections.10 This 
interpretation has brought the clause to the forefront of Utah’s tort 
reform battle.11 Plaintiffs have challenged, sometimes successfully, 
statutes of repose,12 statutory caps on damages,13 governmental 
 
 5.  Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1204 (Utah 
1999) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 6.  Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1280 (“Since legislative tort reform efforts have 
intensified in recent years, the open courts clause has become an important weapon for 
litigants battling to restrain the legislature’s power to modify common-law remedies.”). Tort 
reform refers to legislative reform attempts by business to limit what is seen as overreaching by 
plaintiffs and trial attorneys. Examples of tort reform statutes include shorter statutes of 
limitation, statutes of repose, and caps on damages. To get a feel for the current tort reform 
war, see Jonathan D. Glater, To the Trenches: The Tort War is Raging On, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/business/22tort.html? pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 7.  See, e.g., Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 137–38 (Utah 2002). 
 8.  Thomas R. Philips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 
1313 (2003). 
 9.  Schuman, supra note 4, at 1220. 
 10.  Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1017 (Utah 2002). 
 11.  Gordon L. Roberts & Sharrieff Shah, What is Left of Berry v. Beech—The Utah 
Open Courts Jurisprudence?, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 677, 677–80 (2005). 
 12.  Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985) (holding statute of 
repose unconstitutional under open courts clause); Horton v. Goldminer’s Daughter, 785 P.2d 
1087, 1094 (Utah 1989) (holding builders and architects statute of repose unconstitutional 
under open courts clause); Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah v. Herm Hughs & Son, Inc., 782 
P.2d 188, 194 (Utah 1989) (holding builders’ and architects’ statute of repose 
unconstitutional under open courts clause); Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. 
Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1201 (Utah 1999) (holding builder’s statute of repose as constitutional 
under open courts clause). 
 13.  Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989) (holding $100,000 cap on 
damages unconstitutional after reviewing open courts clause in relation to equal protection and 
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immunity,14 the Wrongful Life Act,15 the Good Samaritan Act,16 and 
the abrogation of the cause of action for loss-of-consortium.17 
The Utah Supreme Court gives a substantive interpretation to 
the open courts clause based on two historical assumptions: (1) 
Utah’s founding generation adopted the clause to prevent big 
business from corrupting the legislature,18 and (2) Utah’s founding 
generation understood the clause to protect all causes of action ever 
recognized in the state’s history, including common-law causes of 
action.19 This Comment argues that the court’s interpretation is 
wrong because the two historical assumptions this interpretation 
relies upon are false. Instead, Utah history shows that the proper 
interpretation of the open courts clause is procedural because that is 
the original meaning of the clause. 20 
In Part II of this Comment, I briefly review the Utah Supreme 
Court’s inquiries into the history of the open courts clause. I begin 
with Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,21 the case establishing the court’s 
two-pronged test, and finish with Laney v. Fairview City,22 the case 
where the court finally adopts a historical theory for its 
interpretation. Part III addresses and then rejects the two historical 
assumptions the court’s interpretation relies upon. I address each 
assumption separately by first presenting evidence supporting the 
 
due process clauses); Judd. v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 141 (Utah 2004) (holding statutory cap 
on damages as constitutional under open courts clause). 
 14.  Laney, 57 P.3d at 1027 (holding Utah Governmental Immunity Act’s redefinition 
of “governmental function” unconstitutional under open courts clause); Debry v. Noble, 889 
P.2d 428, 442 (Utah 1995) (holding core governmental actions outside the protection of the 
open courts clause); Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 1162–66 (Utah 1996) (holding action 
under Governmental Immunity Act as constitutional and outside the protection of the open 
courts clause); Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616, 628 (Utah 2000) (holding statutory cap and 
governmental immunity for firefighter as constitutional under open courts clause). 
 15.  Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 443 (Utah 2002) (holding Utah’s 
Wrongful Life statute constitutional under open courts clause). 
 16.  Hirpa v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 948 P.2d 785, 794 (Utah 1997) (holding Utah’s Good 
Samaritan Act as constitutional under open courts clause). 
 17.  Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869, 871 (Utah 1980) (holding statute abolishing loss-
of-consortium cause of action as constitutional under open courts clause). 
 18.  See infra notes 40–46 and accompanying text. 
 19.  See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 20.  In looking to the original meaning, this Article is not looking to the original intent 
of the drafters, so it will not address certain arguments in that regard. 
 21.  Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670. 
 22.  Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007 (Utah 2002). 
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assumption and then evidence opposing the assumption, evaluating 
the court’s interpretation in the process. Evidence for both sides 
comes from the opinions of Utah Supreme Court justices, outside 
writings by scholars, and my own independent research. Part IV then 
addresses the proper interpretation of the open courts clause given 
Utah’s founding generation’s unique history and what they would 
have known about the clause. The evidence shows that Utah’s 
founding generation would have understood the open courts clause 
to protect access to the courts, procedural due process rights, and 
vested rights. Part V concludes. 
II. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE OPEN 
COURTS CLAUSE 
The Utah Supreme Court’s interpretation of the open courts 
clause relies on little historical research and questionable 
assumptions. Utah first entered the open courts clause debate in 
Berry, the case establishing the court’s complex, two-pronged test.23 
Berry provided little, if any, evidence as to why the court’s 
interpretation was in line with the clause’s original public meaning. 
And subsequent cases did little to back up Berry’s assumptions. It 
was not until Laney—decided seventeen years after Berry—that the 
court settled on a historical basis for its interpretation. 
Berry dealt with the constitutionality of a statute of repose.24 
After the plaintiff ’s husband was killed in an airplane accident, she 
filed suit against both the owner of the plane and the manufacturer. 
But the statute of repose barred the claim against the manufacturer. 
Under the statute, claims had to be brought within ten years of the 
date of manufacture; however, the plaintiff ’s claims were brought 
twenty-three years after the date of manufacture.25 The court 
concluded that the statute of repose violated both Utah’s wrongful 
death clause and Utah’s open courts clause.26 
Utah’s open courts clause reads: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
 
 23.  Schuman, supra note 4, at 1215 (explaining Berry’s “complex methodology”). 
 24.  Berry, 717 P.2d at 671–72. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 686. 
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of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party.27 
To determine whether the remedies portion had been violated, 
the court fashioned a complex, two-pronged test by asking:28 (1) 
Does the statute provide a substitute remedy of equal value? If yes, 
the statute does not violate the open courts clause. If no, the court 
moves to the second prong; (2) Is there is a clear social or economic 
evil? And is abrogation of the remedy or cause of action either an 
arbitrary or unreasonable means of eliminating that evil? If yes, the 
statute violates the clause and is unconstitutional. If no, the clause 
is satisfied. 
In relying on this test, the court made a key but unexpressed 
assumption: that the word “injury” in the clause refers to all causes 
of action ever recognized in the state’s history, in particular 
common-law causes of action (“common law interpretation”).29 
Alternatively, “injury” could refer to all causes of action currently 
recognized by law—statute or common law (“current law 
interpretation”).30 If the assumption in Berry is correct, the test is 
obviously necessary and certain types of injuries are protected 
regardless of the legislature’s recognition of them. But if the 
assumption in Berry is wrong, the test becomes wholly unnecessary. 
The only types of injuries protected are those defined by current law, 
including statutes and common-law rules not overridden by statute. 
No injury means no required remedy. And no required remedy 
means no need for questions about substitute remedies and sufficient 
justifications for eliminating remedies.31 Which interpretation, if 
 
 27.  UTAH CONST. art 1, § 11 (emphasis added). 
 28.  Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. 
 29.  Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1236 (Utah 
1999) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).  
 30.  Id. at 1237. A third alternative is to interpret “injury” to mean every injury—legal 
or not. But “[t]he law simply does not recognize that every harm suffered should be 
compensated. The principle damnum absque injuria, that there can be damage without the 
violation of a legal right, is too well established in our jurisprudence to give such an expansive 
interpretation to the obscure phrasing of the open courts provision.” Id. at 1236. 
 31.  Id. at 1237–39 (explaining the result of current law interpretation of “injury”). 
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either, is correct? The answer depends on how Utah’s founding 
generation would have interpreted the word “injury.” 32 
As stated before, Berry was based upon an unexpressed 
assumption. The court merely noted that the clause “originated with 
the Magna Carta and ‘Sir Edward Coke’s Gloss on Chapter 29.’”33 
But it inquired little, if at all, into the clause’s original meaning to 
Utah’s founding generation.  
The Utah Supreme Court did not explore that question until 
after Berry was decided. It was not until Ross v. Schackel that the 
court’s interpretation was challenged as being out of step with 
Utah’s founding generation’s interpretation.34 The petitioner, 
Schackel, contended that the clause was meant to restrict only the 
judiciary, not the legislature, giving credence to the current law 
interpretation. Schackel based his claim on Utah history, which 
showed a political climate of distrust for courts at the time of the 
constitution’s adoption. But the court ignored his contention 
holding it unnecessary to address because Berry actually supported 
Schackel’s case.35 
Then, in Craftsman, one of Berry’s most loyal supporters,36 
Justice Zimmerman, changed his vote and concluded that Berry 
should be overturned.37 Justice Zimmerman argued and provided 
evidence that Utah had “a history, prior to statehood, of abjuring 
the common law entirely,”38 undermining the court’s common-law 
interpretation. He pointed to two Utah territorial statutes that 
limited or abrogated the common law. Responding to Justice 
Zimmerman’s claims, Justice Stewart wrote a concurrence 
countering that “[t]he warp and the woof of the law in the Territory 
was the common law.”39 He cited three Utah Territory Supreme 
Court cases which concluded that the common law had been 
adopted in the territory. He also noted that Utah adopted its 
 
 32.  See infra text accompanying notes 44–46. 
 33.  Berry, 717 P.2d at 674. 
 34.  Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Utah 1996). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Roberts & Shah, supra note 11, at 688 (noting that Justice Zimmerman was a 
“strong advocate”). 
 37.  Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Better Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1224 (Utah 
1999) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
 38.  Id. at 1236. 
 39.  Id. at 1210 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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constitution during the progressive era when states were trying to 
curb legislative power because of political corruption by big 
business.40 “[This corruption] no doubt influenced the Utah 
Framers,” Justice Stewart wrote.41 The debate between the two 
justices was relegated to separate concurring opinions.42 The court in 
Craftsman did not overturn Berry or decide what historical theory 
supported it. But Justice Stewart’s approach eventually won the day 
with the court. 
In Laney, some seventeen years after Berry, the court adopted 
Justice Stewart’s historical theory to support its interpretation.43 
Writing for the majority, Justice Durham declared that 
“[c]onstitutional language must be viewed in context, meaning that 
its history and purpose must be considered in determining its 
meaning.”44 In the case of the open courts clause, “[t]he 
constitution’s drafters understood that the normal political processes 
would not always protect the common law right of all citizens to 
obtain remedies for injuries.”45 Thus, the history and purpose behind 
Utah’s open courts clause was to prevent “misuse of political 
influence by railroads and other corporate interests, who convinced 
[other] state legislators to favor private interests through 
legislative enactments.”46 
III. WHY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION 
IS WRONG 
The Utah Supreme Court’s interpretation of the open courts 
clause relies upon two historical assumptions: (1) Utah’s founding 
generation adopted the clause to prevent special interests from 
corrupting the legislature, and (2) Utah’s founding generation 
believed the clause would have this effect because they gave a 
common-law interpretation to the clause. But historical research 
shows neither of these assumptions to be true. The first is unlikely. 
And the second is absurd. 
 
 40.  Id. at 1208–09. 
 41.  Id. at 1209. 
 42.  See id. 
 43.  Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007 (Utah 2002). 
 44.  Id. at 1018. 
 45.  Id. at 1019. 
 46.  Id. at 1017. 
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A. The Special Interests Assumption 
As will be shown, it is unlikely that Utah’s founding generation 
adopted the open courts clause to stop special interests from 
corrupting the legislature. The only historical support for this 
assumption is that other states had these concerns and that Utah was 
aware of them. But Utahns trusted the legislature more than any 
other branch of government. Their reasons for restricting legislative 
power are much more nuanced than the court suggests. Further, the 
court offers no evidence directly linking the clause to Utahns’ 
awareness of other states’ concerns. In fact, these states—whose 
experiences Utahns were allegedly relying upon when adopting the 
clause—did not even rely on the open courts clause to resolve their 
own concerns; they adopted different clauses. Thus, it is more likely 
than not that Utahns adopted the clause for reasons other than to 
prevent special interests from corrupting the legislature. 
1. The argument in support of the special interests assumption 
The Laney court notes that Utah adopted its constitution during 
the progressive era.47 In the United States, big business—railroads 
and mining corporations—exercised substantial political control over 
state legislatures.48 Through that control, they were able to obtain 
special privileges and favorable laws.49 As a result, citizens of states 
had grown to distrust their legislatures and sought to restrict their 
power when adopting new constitutions.50 For example, in 
Kentucky’s constitutional convention, one delegate is recorded as 
saying “the principal, if not the sole purpose of the constitution 
which we are here to frame, is to restrain [the Legislature’s] will and 
restrict its authority.”51 Progressives “allied [themselves] with 
 
 47.  See MARTIN B. HICKMAN, THE UTAH CONSTITUTION: RETROSPECT AND 
PROSPECT 18 (1969) (explaining that the progressive era influenced Utah’s Labor Article). 
 48.  Craftsman, 974 P.2d at 1208–09 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Johnny J.S. 
Sorensen, Comment, Adios Statute of Repose: A Temporary Aberration in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1101, 1107–08 (1994)). 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Perkins v. Ne. Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Ky. 1991) (quoting Legislative 
Research Commission, Research Report No. 137, 161 (Jan. 1987)). 
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prolabor interests,”52 pushing constitutional delegates to grant 
greater protections for remedies and causes of action in states like 
Kentucky and Arizona.53 
The court argues that Utahns were aware of these problems and, 
through the constitution, went to work restricting their own 
legislature to prevent the abuses seen in other states.54 For example, 
the court argues that Utah’s constitution prohibits “special laws . . . 
where general laws could apply, but went on to list eighteen specific 
cases where there should be no private or special laws (Art. VI, sec. 
26).”55 Numerous other sections restricted the legislature’s power as 
well.56 Utah also did not adopt clauses found in other states’ 
constitutions that were more clearly procedural instead of 
substantive.57 For example, Washington’s clause simply states that 
“[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without 
unnecessary delay.”58 There is no guarantee of a remedy for every 
injury. Additionally, if the clause were viewed as providing only 
procedural protections, it “is redundant and mere surplusage—it has 
no constitutional role or function that is not already performed by 
[Utah’s due process clause].”59 Thus, the court declares, it is obvious 
that “[Utah’s framers] did not intend to so limit the rights 
guaranteed to the citizens of Utah.”60 
 
 52.  Craftsman, 974 P.2d at 1208–09 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Sorensen, 
supra note 48, at 1107–08). 
 53. Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1017 (Utah 2002) (relying on the histories of 
Kentucky and Arizona as found in Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 811–12, and Kenyon v. Hammer, 
688 P.2d 961, 971–73 n.9 (Ariz. 1984), respectively). 
 54.  Laney, 57 P.3d at 1017–19. 
 55.  Id. at 1018 (quoting JEAN BICKMORE WHITE, CHARTER FOR STATEHOOD: THE 
STORY FOR UTAH’S STATE CONSTITUTION 46 (1996)). 
 56.  Id.; see also UTAH CONST. art. 6, §§ 22, 28, art. 7, § 29, art. 16, § 5. The fact that 
some sections were drafted to restrict the legislature does not mean that all sections must be 
interpreted as broadly as possible to do the same. Instead, the legislature meant what is said 
(i.e. that the legislature should be restricted where the Constitution specifically says it 
should be). 
 57.  Id. This argument follows from the “Modeled or Borrowed Statute Rule,” a textual 
interpretation tool used by courts. See Zerbe v. State, 578 P.2d 597 (ARK. 1978). 
 58.  WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 10. 
 59.  Laney, 57 P.3d at 1018; see also infra Part IV.B. 
 60.  Laney, 57 P.3d at 1018. 
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2. Why the special interests assumption proves unwarranted 
The court’s reliance on other state histories61 hurts its theory 
more than it helps it. Kentucky is the perfect example. Kentucky first 
adopted its open courts clause in 1792 and readopted it in 1891.62 
During the 1890 convention, Kentucky’s delegates disagreed sharply 
on how sweeping the clause’s protections were.63 Delegate W.G. 
Bullitt wanted the convention to adopt64 what is now section 242 of 
the Kentucky Constitution—providing that “corporations . . . 
invested with the privilege of taking private property for public use, 
shall make just compensation for property taken, injured, or 
destroyed . . . . according to the course of the common law.”65 But 
delegate George Washington argued against the section, claiming it 
was duplicitous due to Kentucky’s takings and open courts clauses.66 
He proclaimed: 
For every “legal injury” there is a remedy. So that, not simply upon 
common law principles, but in virtue of [the open courts clause], 
there is a right of recovery . . . . The remedies now afforded seem 
to me to be ample . . . . therefore, [section 242] . . . seems to me 
to be uncalled for . . . .67 
Another delegate, J.F. Askew, responded by saying, “[F]or 
injuries recognized by law you now have your remedy; but I tell you 
he knows that the common law in this respect could be repealed by 
the Legislature. There is no principle in the common law made 
sacred by the Constitution.”68 Bullitt later explained that Section 242 
was necessary because: 
In Kentucky, if an individual constructs on his own property things 
which would damage your property, you have a right of action at 
 
 61.  Id. at 1017–19.  
 62.  Perkins v. Ne. Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Ky. 1991). 
 63.  4 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION 
ASSEMBLED AT FRANKFORT, ON THE EIGHTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1890, TO ADOPT, AMEND 
OR CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 4725–27, 4743–44 (1890) 
[hereinafter KENTUCKY DEBATES]. 
 64.  Id. at 4723–61. 
 65.  KY. CONST. § 242 (emphasis added). 
 66.  KENTUCKY DEBATES, supra note 63, at 4725–27. 
 67.  Id. at 4727. 
 68.  Id. 
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common law; but if a railroad constructs those impediments that 
interfere with the right of enjoyment of you or your own land, you 
have not a right of action, because the Legislature has authorized 
the railroad to construct its bed in the way that it had 
been constructed.69 
In the end, the convention agreed with Bullitt and Askew and 
adopted section 242.70 True, Kentucky and other states were 
attempting to restrict legislative power and prevent corruption by 
big business. But they were not confident that the open courts clause 
could achieve that goal. Instead, they chose to adopt other 
provisions to protect their rights.71 If states that were antagonistic 
towards legislatures did not believe open courts clauses could protect 
the common law, it is unlikely that Utah did. 
Utahns’ relationship with the legislature already differed from 
any other state. For nearly fifty years, Utahns’ only friend in 
 
 69.  Id. at 4743. 
 70.  Id. at 4761. 
 71.  See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 54 (“The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the 
amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property.”); 
KY. CONST. § 196 (“No common carrier shall be permitted to contract for relief from its 
common law liability.”) (emphasis added); KY. CONST. § 242 (“Municipal and other 
corporations, and individuals invested with the privilege of taking private property for public 
use, shall make just compensation for property taken, injured or destroyed by them . . . . [t]he 
amount of such damages shall, in all cases, be determined by a jury, according to the course of 
the common law.”) (emphasis added). The other state history the Court cites to is Arizona’s 
history. Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1017 (Utah 2002) (citing Kenyon v. Hammer, 
688 P.2d 961, 971–73 (1984)). But Arizona adopted more protective clauses as well. See, e.g., 
ARIZ. CONST. art. 18, § 6 (“The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be 
abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.”); ARIZ. 
CONST. art. 2, § 31 (“No law shall be enacted in this state limiting the amount of damages to 
be recovered for causing the death or injury of any person.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. 18, § 3 (“It 
shall be unlawful for any person, company, association, or corporation to require of its servants 
or employees as a condition of their employment, or otherwise, any contract or agreement 
whereby such person, company, association, or corporation shall be released or discharged from 
liability or responsibility on account of personal injuries which may be received by such servants 
or employees while in the service or employment of such person, company, association, or 
corporation, by reason of the negligence of such person, company, association, corporation, or 
the agents or employees thereof; and any such contract or agreement if made, shall be null and 
void.”) (emphasis added). Kentucky interprets its open courts clause in conjunction with the 
other clauses in its constitution explicitly limiting the legislature’s power to abrogate the 
common law—clauses Utah did not adopt. It is also read in light of Kentucky’s founding 
generation’s disdain for its legislature—disdain that Utah did not have. See Perkins v. Ne. Log 
Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 811–12 (Ky. 1991). 
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government was the territorial legislature.72 “The territorial 
governors had been political [and federal] appointees, often poorly 
equipped to cope with the problems of governing. The federal 
judges were often hated and despised. The legislatures on the other 
hand had been the champions of the public will and had enjoyed 
public confidence.”73 To the degree that Utahns did restrict their 
legislature, it was because of experiences borne in other states.74 
Unlike Kentucky, whose “sole purpose” in framing a constitution 
was to restrict the legislature,75 Utah’s purpose was to attract outside 
capital, grow the economy, and become a “magnet for new 
enterprises.”76 Thus, delegates were careful in framing their 
new constitution. 
Utah’s delegates did not worry that special interests would use 
the legislature to avoid liability for injury. Delegate Ryan, after 
commenting on recent injuries in mines, stated that “some 
legislation in that direction would probably be all that would 
be necessary.”77  
The Laney court points out that Utah did not adopt a more 
limited open courts clause like Washington’s.78 But what is more 
telling is that Utah did not adopt any of the clauses that would have 
provided real protection for remedies and causes of action, like the 
clauses from Wyoming79 or Kentucky did.80 “Delegates were given 
copies of all forty-four state constitutions, and they frequently 
 
 72.  MARTIN BERKELEY HICKMAN, UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 74 (1954). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 74–75. 
 75.  See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 76.  Jean Bickmore White, So Bright the Dream: Economic Prosperity and the Utah 
Constitutional Convention, 63–4 U. HIST. QUARTERLY 320, 328 (Fall 1995). 
 77.  2 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION 
ASSEMBLED AT SALT LAKE CITY ON THE FOURTH DAY OF MARCH, 1895, TO ADOPT A 
CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 1047 (1898). 
 78.  Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1018 (Utah 2002). 
 79.  See, e.g., WYO. CONST. art. 9, § 4 (“For any injury to person or property caused by 
wilful [sic] failure to comply with the provisions of this article, or laws passed in pursuance 
hereof, a right of action shall accrue to the party injured, for the damage sustained 
thereby . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 80.  See supra note 71. 
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referred to them.”81 As a result, they most likely knew about these 
clauses, and they would have included them had they wanted to. 
Furthermore, delegates knew how to protect causes of action. 
They did so when they approved Utah’s wrongful death clause, 
which stated that “[t]he right of action to recover damages for 
injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated.”82 But the 
delegates did not protect other causes of action.83 Thus, it is unlikely 
Utah’s adoption of the open courts clause was part of its effort to 
restrict legislative power and prevent special interest corruption. To 
whatever extent the state was worried about big business escaping 
liability, this was limited to wrongful death actions. 
B. The Common Law Assumption 
The Laney court’s special interest assumption is even more 
incredible after considering the assumption it relies upon: that 
Utah’s founding generation gave a common-law interpretation to 
the open courts clause.84 As will be shown below, the court offers no 
historical evidence for this assumption. The only supporting evidence 
is from Justice Stewart’s opinion in Craftsman and outside research 
by American history scholars—if the country as a whole gave a 
common-law interpretation to the clause, then arguably Utah may 
have as well. But even that evidence is merely circumstantial. A 
thorough review of Utah history shows that Utahns ignored, 
derided, and even attempted to abrogate the common law. Thus, the 
 
 81.  White, supra note 76, at 322 n.3. Before 1895, Utah had already drafted several 
constitutions and had attempted statehood a number of times. “The draft constitutions of 
1849, 1856, 1862, and 1869 are almost identical documents and all bear a striking 
resemblance to the Illinois constitution of 1812.” HICKMAN, supra note 47, at 13. The 
constitutions of 1872, 1882, and 1887 were taken principally from the Nevada constitution. 
Id. at 14–15. Utah’s open courts clause was most likely copied from the Connecticut 
constitution. See CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (“All courts shall be open, and every person, for 
an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”). But it was slightly 
changed during the convention debates to remove “sale” and add “unnecessary” to the last 
clause. 1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION 
ASSEMBLED AT SALT LAKE CITY ON THE FOURTH DAY OF MARCH, 1895, TO ADOPT A 
CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 304–06 (1898). 
 82.  UTAH CONST. art. 16, § 5. 
 83.  See UTAH CONST. 
 84.  See supra Part III.A. 
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notion that they interpreted the open courts clause to protect the 
common law is not only improbable but absurd. 
1. The argument in support of the common law assumption 
Outside scholars note that the common law played a leading role 
in America’s war for independence and served as a moral justification 
for the Revolution.85 America’s founding generation recognized that 
they were rebelling against Parliament’s law,86 but they believed 
themselves to be preserving an even older law—the common law.87 
“It was Parliament’s attempts in 1760s and seventies, as Jefferson 
said, ‘to make law where they found none, and to submit us at one 
stroke to a whole system no particle of which has it’s [sic] 
foundation in the Common Law’ that Americans were resisting.”88 
In other words, Americans believed it was England who had rebelled 
against the law; not them. “[F]or example, in 1761, James Otis . . . 
argu[ed] that ‘writs of assistance’ (general search warrants) 
authorized by Britain’s Navigation Act were unconstitutional 
because they violated the common law precept that ‘a man’s house is 
his castle.’”89 Otis was not alone in his belief that England had 
violated common-law rights. Indeed, “[t]he persistent appeals to the 
common law in the constitutional struggles leading up to the 
American Revolution ‘created a regard for its virtues that seems 
almost mystical.’”90 
Winning independence from England was only the beginning of 
America’s struggle to preserve common-law rights. Immediately 
after the war, Americans began the work of drafting the first state 
constitutions.91 In writing their state constitutions, early legislatures 
granted themselves plenary power, believing they were different than 
 
 85.  Ned Miltenberg, The Revolutionary ‘Right to a Remedy,’ 34 TRIAL 48, 48–49 
(Mar. 1998). 
 86.  GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787 
265 (1969). 
 87.  Miltenberg, supra note 85, at 49. 
 88.  WOOD, supra note 86, at 265. 
 89.  Miltenberg, supra note 85, at 49 (citing 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 247–48 
(Charles Francis Adams ed., 1856)). 
 90.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860 4–5 (1977)). 
 91.  Id. at 49–50. 
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the despots they saw as Parliament.92 But of course, it did not take 
long before early state legislatures began to abuse their new-found 
power.93 They began to pass laws confiscating property, suspending 
creditor’s rights, and staying and reversing court judgments.94 “In 
fact, ‘depriving people of common law causes of action for damages 
was not uncommon.’ . . . In Vermont, for example, such legislative 
edicts eventually ‘stopp[ed] nine-tenths of all causes [of action] in 
the state.”95 In response to this legislative tyranny, early states went 
to work “revamp[ing] their state constitutions.”96 The result was a 
constitutional system of checks and balances, separation of powers, 
and guarantees of rights—one of which was the open courts clause.97 
It is possible then that the same feelings and political climate 
present during America’s founding survived through the decades to 
Utah’s founding. As evidence of Utahns’ respect for the common 
law, Justice Stewart cites three Utah Territory Supreme Court 
cases98—each stating that the common law was extended over the 
territory.99 He also notes that many territorial supreme court cases 
applied common-law principles,100 as well as the fact that Utah’s 
Declaration of Rights cannot be understood without reference to its 
common-law heritage.101 As Justice Stewart so aptly put it, “The 
 
 92.  Id. at 50. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. (first alteration in original) (citing WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF 
THE COMMON LAW 91–91 (1975)) (citing WOOD, supra note 86, at 407). 
 96.  Id. at 51. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1209–10 
(Utah 1999) (citing Thomas v. Union Pac. R.R., 1 Utah 232, 234 (1875); First Nat’l Bank of 
Utah v. Kinner, 1 Utah 100, 107 (1873); People v. Green, 1 Utah 11, 13–14 (1876)). 
 99.  Thomas, 1 Utah at 234 (1875) (“Although the Common Law has not been 
adopted in this Territory by any Statute, we entertain no doubt that it should be regarded as 
prevailing here . . . .”); First Nat. Bank of Utah, 1 Utah at 107 (“They have tacitly agreed 
upon maxims and principles of the Common Law suited to their conditions and consistent 
with the Constitution and Laws of the United States, and they only wait recognition by the 
courts to become the Common Law of the Territory.”); Green, 1 Utah at 13 (“[Common law] 
is most positively extended over the Territory of Utah by the express language of the Act of 
Congress providing a Territorial Government for Utah, approved September 
9th, 1850 . . . .”). 
 100.  Craftsman, 974 P.2d at 1210. 
 101.  Id. 
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warp and the woof of the law in the Territory was the 
common law.”102 
2. Why the common law assumption proves absurd 
But even if all the above evidence is taken as true, it does not 
prove that Utah’s founding generation understood the open courts 
clause to carry a common-law interpretation. First, it is far from clear 
as to whether America’s founding generation interpreted the clause 
in this way. And second, even if they did, Utah’s founding 
generation did not. 
First, it is unlikely that America’s founding generation 
interpreted the open courts clauses to mean common-law injuries 
instead of legal injuries. The only evidence in support of the 
common-law interpretation is the general feelings of America’s 
populous.103 There is no statement or writing directly linking the 
open courts clause to those feelings, let alone a common-law 
interpretation of the clause. True, America’s founding generation did 
attempt to prevent the abuses of England and early state legislatures. 
But many of those abuses are prevented by the separation of powers 
and contractual obligations clauses,104 or even a “legal injury” 
interpretation of the open courts clause. Further, some states with 
open courts clauses have other constitutional clauses expressly 
allowing modification of the common law.105 Delaware, the first state 
to ever adopt an open courts clause, is one of these states.106 
Delaware’s constitution declares that “[t]he common law . . . shall 
 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  See infra text accompanying notes 85–102. 
 104.  Clauses like these resolve the problem of legislatures suspending or reversing court 
judgments and interfering with creditor’s rights. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. 9, § 17 (1790) 
(“That no ex post facto law, nor any law impairing contracts, shall be made.”); Banesboro 
Borough v. Speice, 40 Pa. Super. 609, 612 (1909) (“Retrospective laws may be supported 
when they impair no contract and disturb no vested right, but only vary remedies, cure defects 
in proceedings otherwise fair, and do not vary existing obligations contrary to their situation 
when entered into and when prosecuted . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 105.  W. VA. CONST. art. 11, § 8 (1863) (“Such parts of the common law . . . shall be 
and continue the law of this State until altered or repealed by the Legislature.”); WIS. CONST. 
art. 14, § 13 (1848) (“[T]he common law . . . shall be and continue part of the law of this 
state until altered or suspended by the legislature.”). 
 106.  DEL. CONST. art. 25 (1776). See also Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1308 (explaining 
that author of first open courts provision was not trying to “limit the power of the legislature 
in prescribing remedies”). 
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remain in force, unless [it] shall be altered by a future law of the 
legislature.”107 These clauses are in direct conflict with a common-law 
interpretation of the open courts clause. Given the lack of any direct 
evidence in support of the common-law interpretation, and the 
evidence against such an interpretation, it is more likely than not that 
America’s founding generation did not interpret the open courts 
clauses to mean common-law injuries.  
But even if America’s founding generation gave a common-law-
injuries interpretation to the open courts clause, Utah’s founding 
generation did not. Utahns’ interpretation of the open courts clause 
would have been similar to interpretations by nineteenth-century 
courts. But these interpretations in nineteenth-century case law are 
conflicting on whether open courts clauses protect common-law 
causes of action and remedies.108  
For example, in Hotchkiss v. Porter, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court chose one interpretation. The court dealt with a statute 
affecting the common-law cause of action for libel.109 The trial court 
held that the act of 1855—declaring that “unless the plaintiff shall 
prove malice in fact he shall recover nothing but his actual 
damage”110—changed the common-law rule for collecting general 
damages.111 But the Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed: 
It is also recognized in the declaration of rights which is placed in 
the very front of the constitution of this state, and it is there 
provided that “every person, for an injury done him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and 
right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.” This 
right, thus existing and thus secured, legislative authority can not 
[sic] take away, abridge or impair, and any attempt to do it will be 
inoperative and void.112 
 
 107.  DEL. CONST. art. 25 (1776) (emphasis added). 
 108.  Compare Brown v. Board of Levee Comm’rs, 50 Miss. 468, 480 (1874) (“The [due 
course of law] does not demand that the laws existing at any point of time shall be irrepealable, 
or that any forms of remedies shall necessarily continue.”), with Thirteenth & Fifteenth St. 
Passenger Ry. Co. v. Boudrou, 92 Pa. 475, 482 (1880) (“A [statutory] limitation of recovery 
to a sum less than the actual damage, is palpably in conflict with the right to a remedy by due 
course of law.”). 
 109.  Hotchkiss v. Porter, 30 Conn. 414, 418 (1862) (emphasis added). 
 110.  Id. at 419. 
 111.  Id. at 416. 
 112.  Id. at 418 (emphasis added). 
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The court interpreted the statute to conform to the common law.113 
To interpret it otherwise would make it unconstitutional.114 
Hotchkiss stands in stark contrast to Templeton v. Linn County. In 
Templeton, the plaintiff attempted to sue a county.115 But the 
territorial statute making the county liable had been repealed since 
the adoption of Oregon’s constitution.116 The plaintiff argued “that 
by [the open courts clause], the legislature of the state was disabled 
from repealing said territorial statute without enacting another, 
which would be a substantial equivalent for the law as it then stood 
on that subject.”117 But the Oregon Supreme Court disagreed, 
stating that “[a]s a proposition of constitutional law, [the plaintiff ’s] 
contention seems startling . . . no judicial authority was cited upon 
the argument in support of it, and . . . it may be safely assumed that 
none exists.”118 The court held that Oregon’s open courts clause 
protected only vested rights. Thus, the statute was constitutional.119 
Nineteenth-century courts were not alone in their confusion. As 
already noted, delegates to the Kentucky Constitutional Convention 
also disagreed on the open courts clause’s proper interpretation.120 
Whatever the clause’s meaning was to America’s founding 
generation, these examples show that Americans disagreed on its 
interpretation a century later. Thus, Utah’s founding generation’s 
understanding of the clause cannot be based upon America’s 
founding generation’s understanding of the clause. Instead, it must 
be determined from Utah’s own history whether the clause carried 
the common-law interpretation’s meaning. And as the argument 
below will show, Utah’s history provides a second reason why the 
state did not adopt this meaning. 
 
 113.  See id. 
 114.  Id. 419–22. 
 115.  Templeton v. Linn County, 29 P. 795, 795–96 (Or. 1892). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 796. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 797. Concurring with the court, Justice Bean noted that at the time of the 
constitution’s adoption, a municipal corporation could be held liable by both common law and 
statutory law, id. (Bean, J., concurring), yet in O’Harra v. City of Portland, 3 Or. 525 (1869), 
the court upheld a statute exempting the city of Portland from liability. Id. He concluded that 
“[t]he provision of the constitution under consideration in [Templeton] does not seem to have 
been noticed or considered by the court in O’Harra v. City of Portland, but the result of that 
decision is fatal to plaintiff ’s contention here.” Id. 
 120.  See supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text. 
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Utah’s unique history of opposing the common law sets it apart 
from every other state in the Union. This unique history is primarily 
due to Utah’s Mormon history. Upon settling in Utah, the 
Mormon Church: 
[P]erformed the full complement of governmental functions: from 
the granting of permission to engage in business, to the levying of 
taxes, the building of public roads and bridges, and the provision 
for the welfare of the needy; the definition and provision of 
punishment for a full schedule of crimes, ranging from adultery to 
trading with the Indians; the exercise of unlimited power to 
adjudicate in civil and criminal cases; the appointment of law 
enforcement and other officials; the creation of a militia.121 
A few years later, Utahns established the State of Deseret, adopting 
“many of the enactments of the church-government” from before.122 
The same occurred when Congress granted Utah territorial status: 
“the territorial legislature took over . . . [and] in turn, adopted all 
laws of Deseret.”123 Needless to say, the Church exercised enormous 
influence on civil life and the law. 
Utahns view on law and its purposes did not match the common 
law’s view. “[Mormons’] conception of law was not as a protector of 
private rights nor as a regulator of civil society. To them, individual 
rights were subordinate to the larger group goal . . . to build the 
‘Kingdom of God on Earth . . . .’”124 Laws “acquired legitimacy only 
when they” furthered that goal.125 In the words of historian Edward 
W. Tullidge, “[The Mormons’] judicial economy was after the 
patterns of the New Testament rather than after the patterns 
of Blackstone.”126 
As a result, Utahns ignored the common law for property rights. 
For example, early Church actions “amounted to an abrogation of 
the common law in regard to property and riparian water rights.”127 
 
 121.  Orma Linford, The Mormons, the Law, and the Territory of Utah, 23 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIS. 213, 220 (July 1979). 
 122.  Id. at 220–21. 
 123.  Id. at 221. 
 124.  Id. at 223. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 232. 
 127.  Id. at 224. 
JONES.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2016  12:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
830 
Upon entering the valley, Brigham Young declared the “land law.”128 
Under that law, the Church granted each man a plot of land that, if 
not cared for, was taken away.129 Utahns also made water and timber 
“community property.”130 Indeed, “[f]ederal land policies were not 
enforced in Utah until 1869.”131 
Utahns also ignored the common law in the field of criminal law. 
An example of this is demonstrated by Howard Egan’s trial.132 Egan 
was accused of murdering his wife’s lover. At common law, Egan was 
guilty of a “premeditated killing.”133 But Egan’s representative, 
George A. Smith,134 argued that “Egan’s action was justified under 
Utah’s ‘mountain common law.’”135 The principle the court should 
apply, he argued, was that “[t]he man who seduces his neighbor’s 
wife must die, and her nearest relative must kill him!”136 Smith’s 
argument was bolstered by a case from the previous year where a 
man, accused of a similar murder, was acquitted and his adulterous 
 
 128.  Id. at 223. 
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id. at 224. 
 131.  Id. at 223. 
 132.  Michael W. Homer, The Judiciary and the Common Law in Utah, 1850-61, 21 
DIALOGUE: J. MORMON THOUGHT 97, 100 (Spring 1988). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Smith was not an attorney. Utahns disliked lawyers just as much as they disliked the 
common law and courts in general. Linford, supra note 121, at 228–30. It was said that some 
lawyers “returned to the East poorer lawyers than when they left—if such a thing is possible.” 
Id. at 230. This same attitude prevailed until after statehood. This is why Utah’s open courts 
clause, unlike any other state’s clause, says that “no person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party.” UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 11. 
 135.  Homer, supra note 132. Smith’s reference to “mountain common law” may be 
related to Brigham Young’s teachings on the common law. See Linford, supra note 121, at 
224–25 n.49. Young was once asked whether the Utah Territory had adopted the common 
law of England. Young responded that they had not. He explained: 
We have a few Territorial laws, principally directory in their provisions and 
operation. And we have a common law which is written upon the tablets of the 
heart, and “printed on the inmost parts, whose executors and righteousness, and 
whose exactors are peace”; one of its golden precepts is “Do unto others as you 
would they should do unto you.” This common law we seek to establish throughout the 
valleys of the mountains; and shall continue our exertions for its adoption as long as 
we shall continue to exist upon the earth, until all nations shall bow in humble 
acquientscence [sic] thereto.  
Id. at 224 (second emphasis added) (quoting 14 MILLENNIAL STAR, May 19, 1852, at 215). 
 136.  Linford, supra note 121, at 224–25 n.49. 
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wife excommunicated.137 The court rejected this argument but 
“agree[d] that the common law did not apply in Utah.”138 Egan was 
later acquitted on different grounds. But the very next year, Utah’s 
territorial legislature passed a law justifying Egan’s actions.139 
Commenting on this same topic, Church leader Orson Pratt 
denounced the rest of the country that “recognized the common law 
and merely winked at adultery.”140 Utahns were different, they were 
“governed by the laws of God and meted out Old Testament 
punishment for moral transgressions.”141 
The common law was also rejected in “what was probably the 
first law school of the territory.”142 The school was organized by 
Judge Snow, one of the three territorial supreme court justices.143 
Snow taught that “they had ‘a right to make such laws as suited 
[their] own Convenience Notions and circumstances’ and that such 
laws could be enacted ‘without any regard to the Common Law of 
England or the laws which any of the states had adopted.’”144 
It did not take long, however, before Utahns stopped simply 
ignoring the common law and started fighting it. Two of the 
territory’s initial supreme court justices, non-Mormons, were forced 
to flee the state after a dispute with Brigham Young.145 They later 
revealed that the Mormons were practicing polygamy—an act illegal 
at common law146—and challenged Mormons to argue its legality in 
a “national forum.”147 In response, Brigham Young went to the 
 
 137.  Homer, supra note 132, at 100. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 101. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 100. 
 143.  Id. The territorial supreme court was originally made up of three justices. But the 
two other justices, who were non-Mormons, “lasted only a little more than month before 
fleeing the Territory in fear of their lives.” Linford, supra note 121, at 222. See also Homer, 
supra note 132, at 98–99 (explaining in greater detail the two justices’ short stay and reasons 
for leaving). 
 144.  Homer, supra note 132, at 100–01. 
 145.  See supra note 143. 
 146.  Homer, supra note 132, at 98 (“The common law provided that marriage while 
having a living husband or wife was a felony, and the second marriage was void.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 147.  Id. at 101. 
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territorial legislature, asking them “to prohibit all judges from using 
common-law precedent.”148 He proclaimed: 
String a Judge, or Justice, of the legal mists and fog which 
surround him in this day and age, leave him no nook, or corner of 
precedent, or common law ambiguous enactments, the accumulation 
of ages, wherein to shelter, and it is my opinion, that unrighteous 
decisions would seldom be given.149 
The territorial legislature responded and, in 1854, passed a 
statute declaring as much: 
[A]ll questions of law, the meaning of writings other than laws, and 
the admissibility of testimony, shall be decided by the Court; and 
no laws or parts of laws shall be read, argued, cited, or adopted in any 
Court, during any trial, except those enacted by the Governor and 
Legislative Assembly of this Territory, and those passed by the 
Congress of the United States when applicable; and no report, 
decision, or doings of any Court shall be read, argued, cited, or 
adopted as precedent in any other trial.150 
The First Presidency, the Church’s governing authority, followed 
up this legislation with a message to the Saints to “carry on all of 
their activities ‘without any contaminating influence of Gentile 
Amalgamation, laws and traditions.’”151 The First Presidency 
declared the common law to have no application in the Territory.152 
Soon thereafter, Utah’s newest chief justice, John Fitch 
Kinney,153 a non-Mormon, held the territorial legislature’s statute 
illegal under the Organic Act—the law granting Utah territorial 
status.154 “Mormons were furious.”155 Church leaders quickly 
responded claiming that “Congress had given the legislature the 
 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Linford, supra note 121, at 225 (emphasis added). 
 150.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 151.  Homer, supra note 132, at 102. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  To learn more about Kinney, see Michael W. Homer, The Federal Bench and 
Priesthood Authority: The Rise and Fall of John Fitch Kinney’s Early Relationship with the 
Mormons, 13 J. MORMON HIS. 88 (1986). 
 154.  Homer, supra note 132, at 102. The Organic Act granted the territorial supreme 
court and district courts “chancery as well as common law jurisdiction.” Id. 
 155.  Id. 
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‘privilege of excluding the common law at pleasure.’”156 Heber C. 
Kimball went so far as to say that the federal judges “want all hell 
here.”157 
In subsequent decisions, Kinney continued his campaign of 
forcing the common law on Utahns.158 Ironically, Justice Stewart 
cites one of those decisions as evidence that the common law was the 
“warp and the woof of the law in the Territory.”159 But the territorial 
legislature disagreed. “[They] removed Kinney from the Salt Lake 
judicial district and assigned him to remote Carson Valley, later part 
of Nevada.”160 In response, Kinney complained to President James 
Buchanan.161 His “complaints helped convince [the President] to 
replace Young and send an army to Utah.”162 The case Justice 
Stewart cites helped ignite the Utah War. 
The battle over imposition of the common law continued for 
several more decades. Congress “prohibited bigamy in 1862 and 
polygamy” in the 1880s.163 Federal officials sought to imprison 
Church authorities and attack Church finances. This was made 
possible after “the federal government bestowed unprecedented 
powers on its officials.”164 They even went so far as to ban Mormons 
from serving on juries. It was during this time period, that the 
territorial supreme court decided several other cases holding the 
common law applicable in the territory.165 Thus, Justice Stewart was 
correct when he stated that “volumes of the Supreme Court Reports 
for the Territory of Utah are replete with the application of common 
law principles.”166 But those common law principles were not applied 
by Utahns; they were imposed by federally appointed judges. 
 
 156.  Id. at 103. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. at 103–04. 
 159.  Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1210 (Utah 
1999) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing People v. Green, 1 Utah 11, 13–14 (1876)). 
 160.  Homer, supra note 132, at 104. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 107. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1210 (Utah 
1999) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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Even after the common law was forced upon Utahns, they did 
their best to limit its effects.167 In 1882, the territorial legislature 
passed a statute stating, “‘Whenever there is any variance between 
the rules of equity and the rules of common law, in reference to the 
same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail.’”168 This statute was in 
line with Young’s earlier request to prohibit the common law. He 
said, “Let all of our laws have no other practice or rule of decision, 
save it be in the discretion vested in the bosom of the Court.”169 
Two years later, the territorial legislature also “declared that the 
common law rule that statutes in derogation of the common law 
shall be strictly construed had no application to the code of 
civil procedure.”170 
Utahns not only tried to limit the effects of the common law in 
court, they tried to avoid court altogether.171 “[Mormons] did not 
believe in going to law with one another. They took their cases to 
the ‘High Council’ and the courts of their bishops, or Ward 
Councils . . . .”172 These Church courts were not bound by the 
common law. In Church courts, “religious perspectives [were] 
determinative in conflicts arising out of contractual or tortious 
disputes.”173 The more federal pressure increased, the “more 
developed” Church courts came to be.174 The Church courts 
exercised exclusive jurisdiction over Mormons until as late as 1900.175 
 
 167.  Linford, supra note 121, at 227. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 225. 
 170.  Id. at 227. 
 171.  See generally id. at 230–33. 
 172.  Id. at 232. “[Non-Mormons] occasionally took their civil claims to Church courts 
as well.” Robert E. Riggs, Legal and Judicial History of the Church, HAROLD B. LEE LIBRARY, 
http://eom.byu.edu/index.php/Legal_and_Judicial_History_of_the_Church (last 
updated 2014).  
 173.  Edwin B. Firmage, Religion & the Law: The Mormon Experience in the Nineteenth 
Century, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 765, 766 (1991). For more information on church courts, see 
id. at 788–98 (explaining church courts’ structure, jurisdiction, opposition to lawyers and 
technicalities, decisional standards, and substantive law). Church courts were also explained to 
Congress when Congress considered and rejected Utah’s 1887 application for statehood. 
UTAH STATEHOOD: REASONS WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED 8–9 (1887). 
 174.  Firmage, supra note 174, at 788. 
 175.  Id. at 792. Any Mormon who went to civil court before a Church court was subject 
to church sanctions. Id. 
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It was not until after statehood, in 1898, that Utahns adopted 
the common law.176 But even then, it was only adopted in “so far as it 
was not repugnant to, or in conflict with . . . the constitution or laws 
of [the] state.”177 As Justice Zimmerman noted in Craftsman, “An 
interpretation of [the open courts clause] as constitutionalizing in 
1896 the common law, which was not even qualifiedly made the law 
of the state until 1898, is inconsistent with this history.”178 Through 
this statute, the legislature “delegated to state courts the authority to 
develop the common law.”179 And what the legislature delegates, the 
legislature may take away.180 
Given Utahns animus against the common law before statehood, 
it seems doubtful that they would have either meant for or 
interpreted the open courts clause to protect common-law causes of 
action. The 1898 statute delegating the common law evidences 
Utahns’ belief that the common law’s development—including its 
abrogation—was ultimately in the hands of the legislature, not the 
judiciary. With the common-law assumption proven untrue, the 
court’s theory—that Utahns meant for the clause to limit legislative 
power and prevent special interest corruption—does not hold water. 
That being the case, the question then arises: What is the original 
meaning of the open courts clause? 
IV. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF UTAH’S OPEN COURTS CLAUSE 
As shown below, when adopting the open courts clause, Utah’s 
founding generation most likely understood “injury” to mean causes 
of action currently recognized at law—giving the clause a more 
procedural interpretation. Such a reading fits the plain meaning of 
the clause and lines up with the history preceding the clause. Given 
that meaning, the clause protects three general rights: (1) access to 
 
 176.  Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1232–33 
(Utah 1999) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
 177.  Id. at 1232 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-1 (1998)). 
 178.  Id. at 1233. 
 179.  See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Fostering Mutual Respect and Cooperation between 
State Courts and State Legislatures: A Sound Alternative to a Tort Tug of War, 103 W. VA. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (2000) (explaining how state legislatures enacted “reception statutes”) (emphasis 
in original). 
 180.  Id. (“Many ‘reception statutes’ made clear, however, that the power to develop tort 
law that was delegated to the courts could be retrieved by the legislature at any time.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
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courts, (2) procedural due process, and (3) vested rights.181 Given 
Utahns’ history, protection of these rights would have greatly 
concerned the state, unlike protection of common-law causes 
of action.  
A. The Right to Access Courts 
The right to access courts was likely the impetus of open courts 
clauses across the nation. The first clauses were adopted by colonial 
states shortly after the American Revolution.182 Their adoption was in 
response to England’s abuses preceding the war.183 For some time, 
colonists had complained about the Crown’s interference with the 
judiciary and the judges’ lack of independence.184 This reached a 
tipping point with the Stamp Act, whose “effect was to close the 
courts to civil litigation altogether.”185 Many colonists refused to 
obey the order, including Thomas McKean, an author of the first 
open courts clause.186 
But not all of the colonies were so bold. “In Massachusetts, John 
Adams appeared before the Governor’s Council to urge, albeit 
unsuccessfully, that the courts should be reopened in defiance of the 
Stamp Act.”187 For support, he cited the Magna Carta and Chapter 
29 of Coke’s Second Institute—the documents that originated the 
open courts clause.188 “Magna Carta Chapter 40 provides: ‘Nulli 
 
 181.  The last part of the clause would also protect the right to self-representation, but 
that is not addressed here. 
 182.  See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 9; MASS. CONST. part 1, art. 11. 
 183.  See Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1303–05. 
 184.  Id. at 1300–07. For example, colonists complained that the Act of Settlement—
removing English judges’ salaries from the Crown’s control—did not extend to colonial 
judges. Similarly, they complained that their judges did not have tenure. Id. These complaints 
were eventually formalized in the Declaration of Independence, where Jefferson wrote that the 
King had “made judges dependent on his will alone, for tenure of their offices, and the 
amount and payment of their salaries.” Id. (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
para. 11 (U.S. 1776)). 
 185.  Id. at 1303. 
 186.  “A Delaware judge at the time American courts were closed to civil litigation 
because of the Stamp Act, McKean most likely was responsible for inserting the open courts 
clause into the first bill of rights when he drafted the Delaware Declaration of Rights in 1776.” 
Id. at 1298. 
 187.  Id. at 1304. 
 188.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
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vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus, rectum aut justiciam.’”189 
(‘To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or 
justice.’) Expounding on this provision, Coke’s Second 
Institute states: 
[E]very Subject of this Realm, for injury done to him in bonis, 
terris, vel persona [goods, lands, or person], by any other Subject, 
be he Ecclesiastical, or Temporal, Free, or Bond, Man, or Woman, 
Old, or Young, or be he outlawed, excommunicated, or any other 
without exception, may take his remedy by the course of the Law, 
and have justice, and right for the injury done him, freely without 
sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay.190 
Thus, when the colonists were denied access to the courts, it was 
to these words that Adams cited, proclaiming “We deny no Man 
Justice, we delay no Man Justice.”191 The Stamp Act was eventually 
repealed. But its effects were not forgotten. The first states adopted 
open courts clauses patterned after Coke’s Second Institute, 
understanding those words to protect the right to access courts.192 
Utah’s founding generation understood their clause to mean the 
same, as evidenced by the clause’s command that “[a]ll courts shall 
be open.”193 
 
 189.  Id. at 1286 n.38. 
 190.  Id. at 1313 (citing SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF 
THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 55–56 (photo, reprint 1979) (1642)) (emphasis in original). For 
more information on Lord Coke’s inspiration for writing this provision see id. at 1292–96 
(explaining Coke’s fight against the Crown for an independent judiciary). 
 191.  Id. at 1304–05 (citing John Adams, Argument before Governor Bernard and the 
Council in Favor of Opening the Courts (Dec. 20, 1765), in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 152–53 
(Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1977)). 
 192.  See id. at 1299–1311 (explaining events leading up to the first open courts clause). 
Some early states expressly guaranteed the right to access courts. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 9 (“All courts shall be open”). But other states, in concurrence with Adams, seem to have 
understood Coke’s words as already protecting that right. For example, the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, authored by Adams himself, has no express right to open courts. MASS. 
CONST. part 1, art. 11 (“Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, 
by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, 
property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged 
to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably 
to the laws.”). 
 193.  UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 11. 
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B. Due Process Rights 
The first part of Utah’s open court’s clause guarantees access to 
courts. But access to courts alone was not enough. Utahns also 
wanted to protect their rights to remedies and procedural due 
process.194 This reading is evidenced by the plain meaning of Utah’s 
open courts clause, which commands that “every person . . . shall 
have remedy by due course of law.” And as will be shown below, this 
reading is also supported by historical context and Utahns’ adoption 
of similar wording after their struggles in Missouri. 
Utahns’ mindset cannot be understood without knowledge of 
their Mormon history. Mormons first arrived in Missouri in 1831, 
after Joseph Smith, the Mormon Prophet, received a revelation that 
they were to build Zion there.195 Instead of finding Zion, they found 
opposition and hostility.196 “The ‘old settlers’ were from a different 
background than the incoming [Mormons], and it was natural that 
cultural, political, religious, and economic differences arose.”197 
These differences soon spilled over into mob violence.198 The 
Mormons eventually fled the state to nearby Illinois and, from there, 
to Utah.199 “Mormons tend to view the Missouri period from 1831-
1839 as the darkest era in their church’s history.”200 
One of the reasons the Missouri time period was so trying for 
the Mormons was their inability to obtain remedies and due process 
 
 194.  Examples of such due process rights are given by Justice Zimmerman in Craftsman. 
He states that “barriers to the courthouse such as extremely high filing fees, extraordinarily 
short statutes of limitation, or arduous pretrial procedures” violate the open courts clause. The 
clause also “would not permit the courts or legislature to recognize a legal right . . . [while] 
entirely deny[ing] a remedy.” Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 
1194, 1239 (Utah 1999) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
 195.  Matthew Lund, The Vox Populi is the Vox Dei: American Localism and the Mormon 
Expulsion from Jackson County, Missouri 1 (2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Utah State 
University), available at http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/1240. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  CHURCH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, CHURCH HISTORY IN THE FULLNESS OF TIMES: 
STUDENT MANUAL 130 (2003), available at https://www.lds.org/bc/content/shared/
content/english/pdf/ language-materials/32502_eng.pdf?lang=eng. 
 198.  One motive for the mob violence was Missourian’s desire to obtain Mormon 
property. For more information, see Jeffrey N. Walker, Mormon Land Rights in Caldwell and 
Daviess Counties and the Mormon Conflict of 1838: New Findings and New Understandings, 47 
BYU STUDIES 4 (2008). 
 199.  See generally, CHURCH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, supra note 197. 
 200.  Lund, supra note 195, at 1. 
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from Missouri courts. Missourians formed mobs to destroy Mormon 
property and violently forced them from the state. Despite 
Missourian courts being open, Mormons never obtained redress.201 
One such example was the mob attack on October 31, 1833.202 A 
mob approached the home of Mormon leader David Whitmer. They 
“drew his wife out of the house by the hair and proceeded to throw 
down the house.”203 Mormon settlers were able to flee. But before 
they could, they were “whipt and beat, in a savage manner.”204 The 
mob ended up unroofing or destroying ten to twelve homes that 
night.205 The very next night, the mob returned to ransack more 
homes and stores. 
[O]ne of [the mob members], Richard McCarty, was “caught in 
the act of throwing rocks in at the door, while the goods lay strung 
around him in the street. He was immediately taken before Samuel 
Weston, Esq. and a warrant requested . . . but his justiceship 
refused to do anything in the case, and M’Carty was 
then liberated.”206 
State newspapers condemned the mob violence and subsequent 
refusal of the courts to grant redress.207 One newspaper, the St. Louis 
Advocate, argued that: 
Whenever the [ordinary tribunals of] the country are found 
incompetent to preserve the supremacy of the laws, the peace and 
harmony of society . . . the Executive, as the [constant] guardian of 
the laws and rights of the citizens, is bound to interpose and check 
the evil.208 
The governor did eventually deploy the militia in an effort to 
arrest and try those mob members accused of breaking the law.209 
But it was to no avail. The judge adjourned the prosecutions 
concluding that “it was entirely unnecessary to investigate the 
 
 201.  Id. at 2. 
 202.  Id. at 73. 
 203.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 204.  Id. at 74 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 205.  Id. at 73–74. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. at 82. 
 208.  Id. at 83. 
 209.  Id. at 90. 
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subject on the part of the State, as the jury were equally concerned 
[or involved] in the outrages committed.”210 
“Mormons continued to seek [redress] through civil suit.”211 The 
governor encouraged them, writing: “The laws are sufficient to 
afford a remedy for every injury of this kind.”212 Thus, Edward 
Partridge, a Mormon leader who had been assaulted by forty or 
more men, filed suit for $50,000.213 All of the defendants claimed 
self-defense, “alleging that Partridge ‘single-handedly had threatened 
each man “and would then and there have beat, bruised and ill 
treated’” each one had they not defended themselves.”214 In 
defending themselves, Partridge “became a little covered and 
besmeared with tar, pitch and feathers . . . doing no unnecessary 
damage to [him].”215 The court found the defendants liable. But the 
judge only awarded Partridge “a peppercorn and one penny.”216 
Unable to obtain any redress in the courts, the Mormons were 
eventually forced to leave the state. Before they left, it was heard said 
by at least one judge “that there was no law for Mormons.”217 
It was during this time that the Mormons formally adopted a 
form of the open courts clause. Although many of the Mormons 
were in Missouri, church headquarters continued to be located in 
Kirtland, Ohio.218 There, on August 17, 1835, an assembly of the 
Church gathered to formally accept a book of revelations titled the 
Doctrine and Covenants. The Church also voted on and approved an 
article titled Of Governments and Laws in General, which was 
 
 210.  Id. at 90–91 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 211.  Id. at 91. 
 212.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not definitive whether Governor 
Dunklin was referring to Missouri’s open courts clause when he said this. But his choice of 
words is extremely similar to the clause. See MO. CONST. art. 1, § 14 (“That the courts of 
justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, 
property or character, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or 
delay.”) (emphasis added). 
 213.  Lund, supra note 195, at 91–92. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  “Truth Will Prevail,” TIMES AND SEASONS, Jul. 15, 1843, at 267, available at 
http://files.restorationbranches.org/AD%201830-1844/Times%20&%20Seasons/Volume%
204/Vol.%204%20No.%2017%20pp.%20257-272.pdf. 
 218.  CHURCH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS: STUDENT 
MANUAL 344 (2001). 
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published in the Doctrine and Covenants.219 Verse eleven of that 
article, mirroring the open courts clauses of the day,220 declares, “We 
believe that men should appeal to the civil law for redress of 
all wrongs and grievances, where personal abuse is inflicted or the 
right of property or character infringed, where such laws exist as will 
protect the same . . . .”221 This same verse continued to be published 
in Mormon scriptures up through the time of statehood, and is still 
published today. 
The denial of legal remedies for the Mormons did not end in 
Missouri. They were also denied legal remedies in Utah due to the 
federal government’s attempts to shut down polygamy.222 For 
example, in one year, “the Utah Commission barred over twelve 
thousand Mormons from voting in Utah. This was nearly one-fourth 
of eligible Mormon voters.”223 The Mormons sued but lost. The 
court held that “the commission was legally powerless to exclude 
voters, [thus] it was not legally liable for the acts of voting officials 
who wrongfully obeyed” its orders.224 Utah courts also denied 
Mormons their due process rights and remedies when it came to the 
rights of public office and receiving inheritances.225 
 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Open courts clauses were found in all of the states in which the Mormons resided. 
OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 15; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 14; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12. Mormon 
leaders also seem to have cited the Illinois open courts clause when responding to a libelous 
press in Nauvoo, Illinois. See LEGRAND L. BAKER, MURDER OF THE MORMON PROPHET: THE 
POLITICAL PRELUDE TO THE DEATH OF JOSEPH SMITH 347 n.467 (2011) (“[The Illinois 
open courts clause] may have been referred to during the debate.”). Dallin H. Oaks notes that 
the debate record citing the clause likely was an error. Dallin H. Oaks, The Suppression of the 
Nauvoo Expositor, 9 UTAH L. REV. 862, 875 n.88 (1965). However, it is likely that the clause 
was still referenced during the debate. Mormon leaders believed the press to be a nuisance and 
relied on a passage of Blackstone’s Commentaries for support. That passage states that some 
nuisances “require an immediate remedy; and cannot wait for the slow progress of the ordinary 
forms of justice.” Id. at 887 (quoting Hart v. Mayor of Albany, 9 Wend. 571, 609–10 (N.Y. 
Ct. Err. 1832)). It is conceivable that Mormon leaders saw the Illinois open courts clause as 
justifying Blackstone and their actions since that clause gave them the right to “certain 
remedy . . . promptly and without delay.” ILL. CONST. art. 8, § 12 (1818). 
 221.  THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-
DAY SAINTS 134:11 (2013). Interestingly, both the Utah Constitution and The Doctrine and 
Covenants place the open courts clause in the eleventh section of the respective texts. 
 222.  Firmage, supra note 173, at 780–88 (“[F]ederal attempts to simplify and expedite 
the conviction of polygamists routinely denied Mormons many of their fundamental rights.”). 
 223.  Id. at 782. 
 224.  Id. at 783. 
 225.  Id. at 783–87. 
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Given this history, it is clear that Mormons understood the 
clause to protect remedies and due process rights. They were denied 
those rights in Missouri and invoked the clause as proof that they 
were being wronged. They would have understood the clause to 
carry this same meaning when, as Utahns, they adopted it into the 
Utah constitution. The Utah territory supreme court’s recent denial 
of due process rights before statehood may have also motivated the 
clause’s adoption. 
C. Protection of Vested Rights 
The last item that Utah’s founding generation would have 
understood the open courts clause to protect is vested rights to 
remedies. For example, vested rights to remedies means that a 
legislature could not eliminate a plaintiff ’s cause of action or remedy 
during his pending case. At that point, the plaintiff already has a 
vested right that the legislature cannot interfere with. “[E]ven the 
most radical [modern] courts recognize that lawmakers cannot 
deprive plaintiffs of vested rights.”226 All nineteenth-century courts 
recognized the same.227 Thus, Utahns would have also interpreted 
the open courts clause to protect vested rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Utah Supreme Court’s substantive interpretation of the 
open courts clause is wrong and needs correction. The court’s 
common-law interpretation of the word “injury” lacks support. Utah 
history reveals Utahns ignored the common law at first and actively 
fought against it later. When Utahns were in control of their 
government, they sought to eliminate the common law entirely 
through both legislative action and judicial practice. And when they 
lost governmental control due to federal pressure, they sought to 
 
 226.  Schuman, supra note 4, at 1208. 
 227.  See Negroes v. Dabbs, 14 Tenn. 119, 137–39 (1843) (using clause to prevent the 
legislature from interfering in slaves’ pending petition before the Chancery); Townsend v. 
Townsend 7 Tenn. 1, 14–16 (1821) (using clause to strike down statute requiring judgment 
creditors to either delay executing their judgments for two years or accept paper money); 
Templeton v. Linn County, 29 P. 795, 797 (Or. 1892) (noting that open courts clause only 
protects “[v]ested rights [which] are placed under constitutional protection, and cannot be 
destroyed by legislation”); Commercial Bank of Natchez v. Chambers, 16 Miss. 9, 9 (1847) 
(finding statute eliminating vested rights unconstitutional under open courts clause). 
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limit the common law’s effects both by statute and avoidance of the 
judicial system. Given this history, the belief that Utahns gave a 
common-law interpretation to the clause is bordering on absurdity. 
Equally unsupported is the court’s theory of why Utah’s 
founding generation adopted the clause—so as to prevent special 
interests from corrupting the legislature. First, this theory relies on a 
common-law interpretation of the clause which has been proven 
absurd for a state like Utah. Second, the state histories the court 
relies on for this theory show that not even those states believed the 
clause to have the effect the court now claims. Thus, it is unlikely 
that Utahns held this belief. This is especially so given Utahns 
different motivations for adopting a constitution. 
Utahns most likely gave a procedural interpretation to the 
clause—interpreting “injury” to mean causes of action currently 
recognized at law. Such an interpretation would protect a right to 
access courts, due process rights, and vested rights. This 
interpretation is supported by America’s founding history—
explaining why the clause first started appearing in state 
constitutions. It is also supported by nineteenth-century case law and 
Utahns use of the clause in relation to the abuses suffered in 
Missouri. Given this evidence, the Utah Supreme Court should 
overturn Berry and the line of cases which follow. Only a procedural 
interpretation of the open courts clause accords with the clause’s 
original meaning. 
 
Jarom R. Jones* 
  
 
* J.D. candidate, April 2016, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
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